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Monetary policy issues in Hungary 




This paper recounts the evolution of Hungarian monetary policy since the mid-1990s, paying particular 
attention to the recent experience with inflation targeting and a wide-band exchange rate regime 
resembling the exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system, the so-called ERM II. 
This experience on the eve of EU membership is important because the Hungarian authorities believe 
that the benefits of an early adoption of the euro outweigh the possible costs. Consequently, the 
government, supported by the MNB, has declared that Hungary wants to join ERM  II as soon as 
possible after EU membership in May 2004, with a view to adopting the euro in January 2008. As a 
result, the attention of monetary policy in Hungary is increasingly shifting to the next step of the 
integration process, the adoption of the euro. One can distinguish two basic strategies for the adoption 
process. One involves setting a date for joining EMU as quickly as possible, while the second may be 
considered as the “put the house in order first” strategy.  
The first approach has two main arguments in its favour. First, the target date for the adoption of the 
euro and, by extension, for the ERM II entry exchange rate would provide an anchor for market 
expectations. Second, the necessity of meeting the Maastricht criteria by the target date could act as a 
disciplinary force for government policies. The main problem with this approach is that quick adoption 
of the euro may not be feasible, either because the political and social consensus is not strong enough 
to ensure that the Maastricht criteria will be met in the short time required, or because meeting the 
criteria might require very restrictive macroeconomic policies which might, in turn, delay the 
implementation of necessary structural reforms.  
The main advantage of the second approach is that it leaves domestic policymakers greater flexibility 
in implementing structural reforms. Its main disadvantage is that it weakens external pressure on 
policymakers to implement reforms. Moreover, the strategy of putting the house in order first might 
increase the risks associated with the volatility of foreign capital flows. 
Choosing between the two strategies is not straightforward. Each country has to make its own 
decision, taking into account its specific conditions. The MNB therefore prepared an analysis of costs 
and benefits of Hungary’s euro area membership.
2 The study finds that Hungary satisfies many of the 
criteria for an optimal currency area with respect to EMU, and that it is comparable in this respect with 
the less developed euro area members. Thus, Hungary could live with the common monetary policy of 
EMU at least as comfortably as several other euro area members. Adopting the euro would have a 
positive impact on Hungarian economic growth through several channels, the most important one 
being elimination of exchange rate risk and reduced transaction costs, which would lead to increased 
foreign trade, lower real interest rates and greater integration of financial markets. According to 
estimates presented in the study, euro area membership could raise the growth rate of Hungarian 
GDP by 0.6-0.9 percentage points per year in the long run. 
2.  The crawling peg, 1995-2001 
In March 1995, following a period of increasing external and internal imbalances, Hungary adopted a 
preannounced crawling peg exchange rate regime. Monetary policy operated within a narrow (±2.25%) 
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exchange rate band by progressively decreasing the rate of monthly crawl from 1.9% in March 1995 to 
0.2% by April 2001. The interest rate was also progressively reduced. This policy proved to be 
successful, with the inflation rate dropping from 31% in June 1995 to 10.3% by the end of 1998 and 
competitiveness improving. By 1997 the regime had gained credibility and capital inflows had pushed 
the exchange rate to the strong edge of the band, necessitating sterilisation by the central bank. The 
MNB used various instruments to mop up excess liquidity, while keeping in place capital controls to 
discourage short-term capital inflows. The exchange rate regime performed well in the face of shocks 
to emerging markets such as the Asian and Russian crises. 
While this monetary policy framework helped bring inflation down to single digit levels, it proved to be 
inappropriate for further disinflation. Even as the rate of crawl decreased from 0.6% to 0.2% per month 
between 1999 and 2001, the inflation rate stayed in the range of 9-11%. There was no more room for 
monetary tightening as the yearly rate of crawl, at less than 3%, was already negligible. There was 
increasing concern that inflationary inertia could set in. The cost of sterilisation also placed an 
increasing burden on the budget. 
3.  Inflation targeting, 2001-02 
In May 2001, the MNB and the government decided to widen the exchange rate band to ±15% and 
adopt an inflation targeting (IT) regime. This move was followed in June 2001 by the elimination of the 
remaining exchange rate controls to facilitate hedging against the increased exchange rate risk. The 
adoption of inflation targeting also meant a new nominal anchor for monetary policy. While the 
previous monetary regime was anchored to the exchange rate, in the IT regime the inflation targets 
themselves became the new anchor. Soon after the announcement of the new regime, the MNB, 
together with the government, determined the inflation targets for end-2001 and 2002 (7% and 4.5%, 
respectively). The inflation targeting framework was designed to tolerate a ±1% deviation from the 
central target, which was set in terms of headline CPI for at least six quarters ahead. The MNB 
subsequently started to issue a Quarterly Report on Inflation. 
As was expected, the forint started to appreciate significantly against the euro following the widening 
of the exchange rate band. Within the new framework, the appreciating exchange rate was expected 
to lead to disinflation. The economy had got used to a very rapid pass-through during the years of the 
crawling band. It was, however, uncertain how this would change in the new regime. The main issues 
were whether switching the expectations anchor from preannounced crawl to inflation targets would 
work, and how strong the pass-through might become when market participants experienced a 
continuously appreciating currency after years of gradual depreciation. 
In the first years of the new regime the targets for disinflation were met. By December 2001, inflation 
had dropped to 6.8% (from 10.8% in May), just below the target of 7% (Graph 1). It has to be noted, 
however, that external factors (declines in oil and food prices) also played a significant role in the 
disinflation. 
By the end of 2002, inflation had declined to 4.8%, again meeting the target of 4.5% ±1 percentage 
point. During this period, the currency remained on an appreciating trend and capital inflows into the 
forint bond market became even stronger, exceeding EUR 3 billion in 2002. The average maturity of 
foreign holdings was increasing in parallel with the outstanding stock of forint-denominated bonds 
(Graph 2), reflecting the convergence play strategy of investors. Market optimism was boosted by the 
successful conclusion of EU accession talks at the Copenhagen summit in November 2002. 
Beneath the surface, however, serious tensions had started to build up in the economy. 2002 was an 
election year in Hungary, which led to a loosening of fiscal policy. As a consequence, in 2002 the 
deficit of the general government almost doubled, reaching 9.2% of GDP. 
There were also other problems that made the conduct of monetary policy a challenging task. The 
original strategy of inflation targeting was built on the exchange rate pass-through mechanism, as is 
quite common in emerging market IT regimes. The Monetary Council had regularly communicated a 
narrow (approximately 2% wide) “desired” exchange rate band, which would lead the economy to a 
path consistent with the inflation target. The market found these guidelines credible and useful, with 
the market rate remaining within these bands. However, the impact of tight monetary conditions on 
consumer prices turned out to be weaker than expected due to the unexpected fiscal expansion and 
high nominal wage growth. Thus, the central bank had to announce ever stronger levels of the 158  BIS Papers No 23
 
exchange rate consistent with the inflation target. By the end of 2002, the “desired” level of the 
exchange rate needed for reaching the inflation target had moved close to the strong edge of the 
exchange rate band (Graph 3). 
Graph 1 
Inflation rate and targets 
 
  Source: Central Statistical Office. 
 
Graph 2 
Outstanding stock and average maturity of 
non-residents’ government securities holdings 
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Graph 3 
Exchange rate of the forint (inverted scale) 
 
 Source:  MNB. 
By early 2003 market players, especially foreign investors, had come to the conclusion that to reach 
the inflation target the authorities would lift the strong end of the band and let the forint appreciate. In 
mid-January, there was a speculative capital inflow in excess of EUR 5 billion within two days in the 
expectation that the exchange rate would be allowed to appreciate beyond the upper band. However, 
speculators apparently neglected legal arrangements concerning the responsibilities for the exchange 
rate regime, which state that any change in regime, including the change in the bands, needs a 
consensus between the MNB and the government. The government was opposed to widening the 
exchange rate band because of concerns that the stronger forint would hurt competitiveness. It was 
therefore decided to defend the upper band by intervention (buying foreign exchange against the 
forint) and to cut interest rates drastically, thereby demonstrating to the market the MNB’s commitment 
to maintaining the exchange rate band. After these actions, both policymakers and market participants 
started to adjust to the new situation, with the exchange rate stabilising some 4-5% below the strong 
edge of the band. As a response to the large interest rate cuts, the short end of the yield curve shifted 
downwards significantly, with the three-month benchmark rate falling to the level of long yields at 
about 6.2% (Graph 4).  
Graph 4 
Benchmark government securities yields 
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In early June 2003, the government initiated a 2.2% devaluation of the exchange rate band in order to 
cap the strong edge of the band at HUF 240 per euro, instead of the previous level of HUF 234.7 per 
euro (Graph 3). The aim was to assure exporters that the currency would not be allowed to appreciate 
beyond the new upper edge of the band. This move disturbed the markets, as it was interpreted as a 
loss of commitment to disinflation. As a result, the exchange rate depreciated by 5% on the day of the 
devaluation. To stop a further depreciation and to demonstrate commitment to disinflation, the MNB 
hiked interest rates by 300 basis points in June.  
In July, the government and the MNB declared that Hungary aimed to join the euro area by January 
2008 and ERM II as early as possible after EU accession in May 2004. This commitment would 
require very tight fiscal and incomes policies in the coming years. The 2004 budget submitted to 
parliament foresaw a reduction in the deficit, but the budget plans caused some disappointment 
among market participants, as it focused on increasing revenues instead of reforming public 
expenditure. The exchange rate did not respond positively and long-term yields did not decrease. The 
market is still hesitant at the time of writing and is looking for visible signs of fiscal tightening. One 
positive sign is that the wage guidelines agreed with the trade unions will, if respected by all interested 
parties, help the disinflation process. 
4. Conclusions 
Some conclusions can be drawn from the Hungarian experiences. 
1.  Smooth transition to a successful inflation targeting regime is possible even for countries 
lacking experience with traditional channels of monetary transmission. The example of the 
MNB in 2001 and 2002 shows that well chosen inflation targets can be reached, even if there 
is little a priori knowledge of the exchange rate pass-through of an appreciating currency. 
2.  The Maastricht criteria require parallel attainment of price and exchange rate stability. 
However, in some situations central banks in accession countries cannot target price and 
exchange rate stability at the same time. In Hungary, for instance, monetary policy had to 
rely to a great extent on the exchange rate pass-through in the process of disinflation. 
Keeping the exchange rate stable when price stability has to be reached from a starting point 
of high inflation could thus prove quite challenging. 
3.  The recent Hungarian experience clearly underscores the importance of an appropriate mix 
of monetary and fiscal policies to reach and maintain price stability. If fiscal policy runs 
unsustainable deficits the central bank is left with no good options: it can either respond to 
the loose fiscal policy by creating tight monetary conditions (which can lead to excessive loss 
of output and prolonged conflicts with the government) or risk its own credibility by 
accommodating the fiscal loosening and thus loosening its commitment to price stability. In 
other words, there is no good monetary policy if policymakers cannot see eye to eye on the 
objective of price stability and on the best policy mix to achieve it. 
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